ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Active distribution systems (ADSs) are "distribution networks with systems in place to control and manage a combination of distributed energy resources (DERs), defined as generators, loads and storage. Distribution system operators (DSOs) have the possibility of managing the electricity flows using a flexible network topology. DERs take some degree of responsibility for system support depending upon on a suitable regulatory environment and connection agreement" [1] - [2] . Intrinsically, ICTs are critical components in the successful deployment of ADSs, and as a consequence power delivery systems are expected to become increasingly reliant on these technologies. At present, however, there are limited tools available to aid understanding and assess the potential relationships between the ICT and ADS reliability. Moreover, clear assessment guidelines and data specifications do not exist.
CIGRE WORKING GROUP C6.19
The C6.19 WG aims to address the following issues:
1. Survey on the state of the art on planning for active distribution systems; 2. Requirements of planning methodologies; 3. Identification of short, medium and long term models for active distribution system planning; 4. Reliability models of active distribution systems; 5. Algorithms for active distribution system expansion and upgrade planning, including demand-side integration and storage. In order to evaluate the assessment gaps associated with ADS reliability, the WG is compiling experiences and practices around the world. This paper highlights some of the Working Group activities in this area.
ICT RELIABILITY
While advanced cyber-technologies offer potential reliability improvements, software and cyber network failures -whether unintentional or deliberate -may result in undesirable operation of active distribution networks. Assessing the reliability benefits and impacts from advanced information and control technology (ICT) implementations requires an increased understanding of reliability and interaction of cyber-physical system.
The ability of control systems to maintain confidentiality, integrity, and availability in light of disturbances including unexpected threats and malicious cyber attacks is a key concern with ICT. This includes the ability to evaluate the controls operation given varying levels of measurements and control signal trustworthiness and dependability. Furthermore, assessment of the potential risks from unintentional operations and malicious attacks should be identified in context of physical system reliability impacts.
Both physical and cyber system outages can potentially result in undesirable operation of ADSs which in turn adversely affects overall system reliability. While deterministic evaluation of physical contingencies is well established, practices for incorporating cyber-network contingencies within these assessment frameworks are in their embryonic stages [3] , [4] , and [5] . Table 1 provides communications reliability data for weather station monitoring systems for a 28-day period in a UK-based ADS implementation trial project. In this project, monitored weather data is used to assess, in open loop (noncontrolling), the real-time thermal rating of overhead lines within a distribution network. Weather stations were installed within a wide geographical area and five of these communicate to the distribution network operator's (DNO's) network management system (NMS) through hard-wired copper and fibre optic communication. Other, more remote monitoring stations communicate to the NMS by using GPRS. As part of the project, the intelligence has been embedded in the SCADA system to detect the healthy (1) or unhealthy (0) operation of the monitoring system. This allows the reliability of the monitoring system to be quantified and the causes of interruptions to be identified. This granularity of information aids in the wider business acceptance of real-time thermal rating systems. Stockholm, 10-13 June 2013
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Paper No 1370 The results provided in Table 1 indicate six weather stations experience a five-minute downtime during the 28-day period, due to a firmware upgrade on the RTU platforms. This corresponds to a reliability of 99.99%. Three of the GPRS-based weather stations experienced significantly longer periods of downtime due to the signal strength and variable bandwidth of the GPRS communication system. In order to reduce the impact of the communications reliability on the performance of the real-time thermal rating system, intelligence has been embedded within the DNO's NMS that allows the system to gracefully degrade and make increasingly conservative estimates of the real-time thermal rating of the overhead line network as an increasing number of signal inputs to the system are lost.
ADS RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
The introduction of the active management of the distribution networks and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) may have a twofold (ambivalent) impact on distribution system reliability. On one hand, it can ameliorate the traditional reliability indexes (SAIDI and SAIFI) for passive loads and the availability of the connection for independent producers by means of specific operation practices such as intentional islanding and self healing and auto-reconfiguring networks as illustrated in Figure 1 . However, there are some concerns that the adoption of new technologies and increased system complexity will actually be detrimental to the high degree of reliability which is currently achieved.
Indeed, in contrast with the common practice where technical constraint violations are avoided (or minimized) in the planning stage, the active management will be used to solve many contingencies (overloads or excessive voltage variations) in the operation stage directly when they appear, deferring some network investments dictated by the traditional passive approach. In an ideal representation of the control system (always available with no errors in the control procedures and in the communication), the ADS clearly improves or at least preserves the reliability of the existing distribution system with lower network costs. Every system can fail, however, and the reliability of the active management and the ICT system can impair the overall performances of the distribution system.
According to the previous considerations, two kinds of reliability analysis are requested for the ADS. The first category should be focused on the quantification of the benefits introduced by new solutions, like intentional islanding. The second one should explicitly consider the reliability of the enabling technologies (particularly of ICT) needed to implement specific ADS applications in order to evaluate their effect on the reliability of the whole system. However, the imminent revolution on the distribution system operation, with strong interdependencies between the cyber and the power systems, will necessitate adoption of modern stochastic methods to assess its reliability performance.
Several methodologies to perform probabilistic assessments have been developed and can be classified as either analytical or simulation approaches. The first category represents the system as mathematical models and evaluates the reliability performance through numerical solutions (e.g. state enumeration method). In contrast, the simulation approach estimates reliability by simulating the actual process and the random behaviour of the system. By treating the problem as a series of experiments, the simulation approach can include system effects which may have to be approximated in a direct analytical method, making this approach more flexible when complex operating conditions and system considerations need to be incorporated. Hybrid techniques have also been proposed which attempt to merge the benefits of both approaches [9] .
Both approaches have pros and cons and neither of the two can be considered better than the other: the choice should be based on the system, its characteristics and the level of details and in-depth analysis required. In any case, with many types of predictive or probabilistic reliability analysis, it is worth noticing that the incremental difference in certain indices resulting from a proposed solution is more important than the absolute value of the index. In other words, even if some aspects of the system are disregarded or not perfectly modelled, the main application of these methodologies is the comparison among different planning and operating schemes of the power system and the relative improvement or deterioration of the reliability performances. Moreover, even with some simplifications, the whole system representation should remain realistic and must co-simulate both cyber and the power systems. 
CO-SIMULATION
Co-simulation refers to the simultaneous simulation of power delivery and communications networks. Historically, each function is simulated separately with each study discipline assuming the other works perfectly. Obviously, this cannot always be the case. In general, an active distribution network, such as shown in Figure 1 , can be regarded as a system that implements some form of feedback control. The behaviour of such feedback system cannot be evaluated accurately by analyzing two halves of the feedback loop in isolation.
This area of modelling and simulation is one of the larger gaps in tools for planning ADSs that are heavily reliant on communications and control working as intended. Papers [3] - [8] represent the first steps in this direction with different levels of approximation of the ICT and control systems within ADS reliability analyses.
CO-SIMULATION TOOL FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
This section describes some of the high-level technical and economic functions that co-simulation tools should provide to simulate the operation of the power system, communications infrastructure and information technology control systems at the same time.
User requirements
The co-simulation tool should:
1. provide visualization of the complete Active Distribution System, with all the power system, communications and information technology elements represented on the screen, 2. incorporate a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to allow users to plan and optimize the active Distribution System and avoid any single points of failure in the power systems, communications and information technology infrastructure, and 3. make provision to allow the user to introduce equipment failures, maintenance downtime, and quantify the impact on system reliability indices.
Technical functions
Power System: Allow the user to model present asset base, protection systems and new types of power system assets (high-temperature conductors, fault current limiters) and protection systems (multi-functional relays) while supporting standard functions including load flow, short circuit analysis, transient stability and power quality.
Communications and monitoring systems: (i) Allow the user to model different communications media such as hardwired copper, fibre optics, power line carriers, GPRS and radio.
(ii) Allow the user to generate a time-varying bandwidth for signal passage; (iii) Allow the user to implement synchronous and asynchronous signals and understand the impact of latency of data transfer on control algorithms; and (iv) Allow the user to model monitoring systems and their impact on reliability (for example signal drift).
Information technology: (i) Provide user-defined logic for controllable entities; (ii) Allow the user to model data refresh rates; databases and capacities for storing information; and (iii) Make provision for customizable graphical user interfaces (GUIs) to allow the information displayed to the planning or operations engineer to be adjusted.
Economic functions
Through the quantification of reliability indexes, allow the user to quantify, financially, the cost of ADS failures. Thus informing and directing investment decisions regarding capital, operational, and maintenance expenditures. Stockholm, 10-13 June 2013
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DATA REQUIREMENTS
Specific attention has been given in the previous sections to the main features of the ADS that need to be represented and the methodologies that should be used for the calculations. The importance has been highlighted of developing new models and new tools to correctly deal with this complex cyber-physical system. However, specific data have to be available for an effective exploitation of the new procedures and to perform not only qualitative but also quantitative reliability analyses.
Time-series representations
Time-series simulations will be a key feature of software supporting active distribution networks in general as well as needed to perform reliability analyses based on advanced stochastic techniques. Most existing distribution system analysis tools were originally designed to support traditional planning analysis where the main task was to solve the power flow at one specific point in time -typically the predicted peak demand. However, active distribution network implementations will no longer permit DNOs to solve technical issues exclusively at the planning stage as the active management of the system must be considered. Complete analysis of smart system operations and impact on the system reliability (including ICT) require explicit representation of the time variability of demand and generation.
While the development of smart metering will help distributors to collect actual load and generation profiles from every node, few distribution utilities worldwide have currently installed smart meters. Furthermore, the amount of history data available is often not enough to properly obtain reliable energy estimation. Therefore, focused efforts have to be made in measurement campaigns in order to update and convert the traditional "peak value" load and generation models into modern time-series representations. In the interim, new techniques of energy forecasting may be explored to compensate the lack of data [10] .
ICT Performance Statistics
Methods for analyzing the impact of cyber performance and failures must consider communication system integrity, device failures, and cyber security risks with regards to the resulting physical system impacts [11] . Models pertaining to the operation and reliability of cyber assets and systems are also needed. However, data related to cyber asset life cycles and failure rates may be initially limited. ADS pilot projects will need to support focused data collection and surveys (similar to the UK project previously noted) and promote engagement between utilities and researchers.
CONCLUSION
ICTs are critical components in the successful deployment of ADSs and power delivery systems are expected to become increasingly reliant on these technologies. These technologies should be considered when evaluating ADS reliability with some issues and approaches presented here. Further work on the planning of ADSs is due to be disseminated by the CIGRE C6.19 WG report in 2013.
